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BOOK REVIEW 
ENVIRONMENT AND EQUITY: A REGULATORY CHAL-
LENGE. By Daniel Mandelker. New York, N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 
1981, Pp. 162. 
Reviewed by Alan Weinstein * 
Daniel Mandelker, Stamper Professor of Law at Washington Uni-
versity in St. Louis, has written extensively on environmental and 
land-use problems. In this new work, Mandelker seeks to develop a 
comprehensive view of the problems raised when the legal system 
makes distributive judgments affecting land-use opportunities. 
Thus, rather than the broad inquiry into environmental policy which 
its title suggests, this volume looks more deeply at a narrower issue: 
" . .. the distinctive legal and conceptual problems raised by en-
vironmentalland-use controls."l 
Environment and Equity explores how the legal system has 
reacted to these new controls and attempts to explain the direction 
taken by the courts and legislatures when reviewing or applying 
them. The book's nine chapters may be grouped into three major sec-
tions. The first three chapters introduce the reader to the operation 
of private land markets, indicate how traditional land-use regulation 
alters the operation of these markets, and examine why neither 
private bargaining nor traditional regulations can deal with the sub-
jective values explicit in environmentalist legislation. Next, in four 
* Assistant Professor of Urban Planning at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. M.C.P. 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1979. J.D. University of California at Berkeley, 1977. 
B.A. University of Pennsylvania, 1967. 
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chapters that form the most accessible and satisfying part of the 
book, Mandelker carefully analyzes how the courts have treated en-
vironmental land-use controls and the charges of exclusionary zon-
ing that often accompany implementation of such controls. This sec-
tion also contains a thorough consideration of the impact of state 
constitutional guarantees of environmental quality on land-use deci-
sions by state courts. The book concludes with a chapter on 
legislative land-use policymaking, devoted entirely to a discussion of 
coastal zone management programs, and a final chapter that reviews 
the author's conclusions and states his forecasts for future 
developments in the field. 
Mandelker argues that all the attention to the fight against en-
vironmental pollution obscures the transformation in land-use 
regulation achieved by the environmental movement. In his view, 
this transformation consists of new land-use controls that give 
priority to one set of values-environmental protection. These new 
controls represent a sharp break with traditional land-use planning 
and regulation which do not favor any particular set of priorities. As 
a result of this transformation, the legal system is now required to 
make distributive judgments that allocate economic opportunity in 
land markets; for example, coastal zone management programs that 
restrict development on one stretch of coast but permit another to be 
developed.2 Further, these new land-use controls raise a second set 
of distributive problems: they create the potential for exclusionary 
zoning if they are excessively prohibitive. The problems raised by the 
potential for exclusionary zoning will also fall to the courts for 
resolution. 
In Mandelker's opinion, the legal system is not well suited to make 
the distributive judgments necessitated by this transformation in 
land-use regulation. Mandelker says that the legal system will not 
readily accept the distributive role required by environmental land-
use control and the judicial correction of exclusionary zoning. In his 
view, both the courts and legislatures shy away from making these 
distributive judgments. Mandelker concludes that if environmen-
talists are dissatisfied with the legal system's reaction to the new en-
vironmental land-use controls, they should return to the political 
arena and try to convince a majority that environmental protection 
should be a transcendent value. 
2. Courts and legislatures make distributive judgments when their decisions impose losses 
on some landowners by prohibiting or limiting the opportunity to develop land, and create 
gains for other landowners by explicitly permitting certain types of development. 
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I do not disagree with either of the arguments set out. Nor do I 
disagree with the basic conclusions drawn by Professor Mandelker. 
Courts and legislatures do shy away from making distributive 
judgments and the political arena is the proper forum for arguing 
transcendency of environmental values. Furthermore, I agree with 
Mandelker's conclusion that environmental protection is the 
transcendent value in land-use regulation. Nevertheless, except for 
the middle four chapters, I found too many parts of this book poorly 
focused and, as a result, potentially misleading. In short, the book 
presents a supportable thesis but does not always adequately sup-
port it. 
Chapter Two, titled "The Case for Environmental Land-Use 
Regulation" exemplifies my concerns. In this chapter, Mandelker 
challenges economists' claims that markets, i.e., private bargaining, 
can produce socially optimal outcomes when they consider en-
vironmental cost problems. Essentially, Mandelker argues that 
governmental regulation is preferable to bargaining in the presence 
of environmental costs for two reasons. First, bargaining cannot 
consider the distributive impacts bargains impose. Second, bargain-
ing cannot consider diffused environmental costs because the trans-
action costs are too high. Thus, while Mandelker acknowledges the 
efficiency in the sense of movement towards pareto optimality in-
herent in markets, in his view bargaining is incapable of valuing dif-
fuse environmental costs and disregards the distributive conse-
quences of market transactions. Mandelker argues that government 
intervention is necessary because these shortcomings are inherent in 
the bargaining process. 
Mandelker's treatment of the basic concepts central to this argu-
ment is quite competent. He introduces the reader to the notion of 
pareto optimality, 3 shows how bargaining can achieve efficient out-
comes, and explores the problem of market failure. His argument is 
3. Pareto optimality is one definition of economic efficiency in a society. Whenever 
resources can be reallocated in a manner that makes at least one person better off without 
making anyone else worse off, we can increase the total welfare of society at no cost. When we 
have reallocated all resources according to the above rule, we will have achieved maximum 
social welfare and will be using our resoures in the most efficient manner possible: i.e., any fur-
ther reallocation would make at least one person worse off. This condition of maximum effi-
ciency is termed Pareto optimality. 
Vilfredo Pareto, an Italian sociologist (1848-1923), first formulated the mathematical rules 
underlying the above analysis. The classic exposition of the rule is found in Arrow and Debreu, 
Existence of an Equilibriumfor a Competitive Economy, ECONOMETRICA vol. 22 no. 3 (1954). A 
good introductory discussion may be found in B. ACKERMAN. ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF PROP· 
ERTY LAW (1975). 
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far less satisfying, however, when he moves to a consideration of 
whether external costs can be internalized in markets by nuisance 
law and bargaining. In this part of his argument, Mandelker seeks to 
refute the argument that nuisance law or bargaining, rather than 
government intervention, can solve the external cost problem. In the 
course of this refutation Mandelker introduces the reader to Ronald 
Coase's ideas concerning the interactions among judically imposed 
nuisance rules, bargaining, and efficiency. In my view, Mandelker's 
treatment of Coase is self-serving and misleads the reader who is un-
familiar with Coase's work. It is worth examining Mandelker's treat-
ment of Coase's views in some detail. 
Mandelker seeks to refute the argument that nuisance law or 
bargaining, rather than government intervention, can solve the ex-
ternal cost problem. Mandelker first notes the economists' claim that 
"with the appropriate definition of property rights, bargaining can 
include external as well as private costs to provide efficient land-use 
solutions."4 He then cites Coase's seminal article, "The Problem of 
Social Cost,"5 for the proposition that bargaining to eliminate exter-
nal costs will, under appropriate conditions, be independent of the 
initial assignment of property rights. Mandelker writes: 
Coase's bargaining avoids the value judgments necessary in 
an initial assignment of property rights because Coase claimed 
that the bargaining outcome is indifferent to the initial assign-
ment. The difficulty is that the initial assignment of property 
rights does affect Coase's bargaining. Coase assumed in his ex-
ample that neither farming nor cattle ranching has an initial 
claim as a preferred land-use. This assumption is not correct. 
Property ownership does not exist in a vacuum, but is legally 
defined by society even when it does not decide between com-
peting land uses. 
Society may later decide that agricultural resources are 
limited and entitled to a proper claim in any conflict with com-
peting uses. British planning law makes this assumption. Be-
cause it accepts the present allocation of priorities among com-
peting land uses, the Coase approach reinforces the status quo in 
land-use allocations. It provides a method for changing these 
priorities to achieve an efficient land-use solution, but it ignores 
the distributive impacts this solution creates. Coase's starting 
point is the present assignment of land-use priorities, and he 
assumes this assignment is "socially" correct. 6 
4. D. MANDELKER, supra note 1 at 9. 
5. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
6. D. MANDELKER, supra note 1 at 10-11 (footnotes omitted). 
1983] ENVIRONMENT AND EQUITY 207 
These two paragraphs contain several statements about Coase's 
article that are misleading. Mandelker suggests that Coase did not 
consider how assignment of property rights would affect bargaining; 
that Coase assumed that the present assignment of land-use 
priorities is "socially" correct, and implicitly, that Coase is un-
concerned with distributive impacts. Further, Mandelker fails to 
clarify the "appropriate conditions" under which bargaining would 
solve the external cost problem, so that the reader without training 
in economics is left wholly to his own resources to understand 
Coase's assumptions. 
What really is Coase's argument? Essentially, Coase argues that 
cost-free bargaining, that is, bargaining with no transaction costs, 
will always achieve an economically efficient result. In fact, where 
bargaining is costless, Coase shows that neither legal rules nor an 
initial assignment of land-use priorities will affect bargaining out-
comes. But Coase then acknowledges that bargaining is not cost-free 
in the real world and considers the effect of an initial assignment of 
rights when transaction costs are greater than zero. He concludes 
that the assignment of legal and property rights does have an effect 
on economic efficiency. This conclusion leads to a prescription for 
the legal system when it considers any given arrangement of prop-
erty rights: courts should understand the economic consequences of 
their decisions and take these consequences into account when mak-
ing their decisions. Thus, rather than assuming that current proper-
ty assignments are correct, Coase is arguing that they very well may 
be incorrect, i.e., inefficient, and that courts should consider 
economic consequences when called upon to assign property rights, 
for example, in nuisance litigation. Further, Coase notes that 
government regulation may, at times, be the correct solution to cer-
tain external cost problems in the presence of transaction costs. 
Finally, Coase is not unaware of the distributive effects of his pro-
posals, as he writes: "But it is, of course, desirable that the choice be-
tween different social arrangements for the solution of economic 
problems should be carried out in broader terms than this and that 
the total effect of these arrangements in all spheres of life should be 
taken into account."7 
Mandelker, I believe, has oversimplified Coase, and thereby 
erected a straw man whose weak opposition he readily confutes. A 
fuller reading of Coase, however, reveals that he and Mandelker ac-
7. Coase, supra note 5 at 43. 
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tually agree on the basic proposition that private markets and 
bargaining will often fail in the real world, and, when such failures 
occur, government intervention may be well-advised. For example, 
Coase, after noting the problems inherent in government regulation, 
concludes: 
But equally, there is no reason why, on occasion, such govern-
mental administrative regulation should not lead to an improve-
ment in economic efficiency. This would seem particularly likely 
when, as is normally the case with the smoke nuisance, a large 
number of people are involved and in which therefore the costs 
of handling the problem through the market or the firm may be 
high.s 
This problem with the author's treatment of Coase stems, I 
believe, from Mandelker's failure to acknowledge that Coase treats 
the private bargaining question in both its theoretical and pragmatic 
aspects. Without exposure to both these aspects, the reader fails to 
grasp a key element in Coase's theorem: private bargaining will not 
produce efficient outcomes in the presence of transaction costs. 
It is fruitless to speculate on the author's reasons for this omission, 
but consider what it means in terms of this book's intended audience. 
The uninitiated reader is led to believe that "economists" maintain a 
position on the role of private bargaining that is quite absolute. This 
belief will prove, at best, confusing, and could well mislead the 
reader with no background in microeconomics. For anyone already 
conversant with the literature, on the other hand, the author's views 
are merely provocative. Unfortunately, the chapter on economics is 
not the only one where the reader's background is of concern. 
Although the legal analysis found in the middle four chapters is 
generally quite well done, I question what criterion the author used 
when choosing to omit any discussion of the "growth management" 
cases from chapter six, entitled "The Judicial Attack on Exclu-
sionary Zoning."9 That choice is puzzling when other authors find 
the most vexing problem with exclusionary zoning litigation to be 
distinguishing between good-faith planning efforts aimed at 
regulating growth-which may also have incidental exclusionary im-
pacts-and growth management "schemes" that speak in planning 
terms but whose purpose is exclusion.10 The novice reader of 
8. Id. at 18. The "smoke nuisance" referred to above may be read to exemplify the class of 
diffuse environmental pollution problems in which high transaction costs will prevent private 
bargaining from achieving a socially optimal solution. 
9. D. MANDELKER. supra note 1 at 79-106. 
10. See D. GoDSCHALK. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES OF GROWTH MANAGEMENT (lH79); BLUM-
STEIN. A Prolegemenon to Growth Management and Exclusionary Zoning Issues, 43 LAW & 
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Environment and Equity would remain ignorant of this critical 
debate. Similarly, the chapter on legislative policymaking deals 
almost exclusively with coastal zone management programs, with no 
adequate treatment of other legislative land-use programs.ll Omis-
sions of this sort suggest caution in recommending this book to 
anyone not already familiar with basic micro economic theory and the 
judicial and legislative development of land-use controls in the past 
decade. 
Despite its faults, Environment and Equity is a welcome addition 
to the literature. Professor Mandelker is a major academic figure in 
his field and this effort clearly shows why. Mandelker's focus on the 
tensions between competing values is illuminating and the forth-
rightness of the author's opinions forces the knowledgeable reader 
to call his own preconceptions into question. If Environment and 
Equity lacks focus, the reason may be that the scope of the author's 
concerns dictates that some subjects emerge from the discussion a 
bit blurred and indistinct. 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. (1979); J. ROSE, AFTER MOUNT LAUREL: THE NEW SUBURBAN ZONING 
(1977). 
11. See R. HEALY AND J. ROSENBERG, LAND USE AND THE STATES (2d ed. 1979). 
